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Paper presentation prepared for FUROR 1: Futures of Research – Advancing sociocultural 
psychology in Europe, Neuchatel, Schweiz, June 22-25 2009 
 
A normative sociocultural psychology? 
Svend Brinkmann 
 
 
Introduction 
First, I will begin by saying a big thank you to the organizers of this event – Alex, 
Flora and Tania! Thanks for organizing this and for inviting me. I have really been 
looking forward to this week, and I am thrilled to be here! 
 
Second, I should perhaps say a few words about my interests in order to introduce 
myself. I originally studied philosophy and switched to psychology, but philosophical 
problems continue to haunt me in a way that I hope is fruitful to an understanding of 
psychological matters. This manifests itself in two ways: On the one hand I have been 
writing on the relevance of philosophy, and of philosophers such as John Dewey and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, for psychology, and this is an ongoing interest of mine. On the 
other hand, I find myself incapable of approaching any psychological topic without 
struggling with questions such as: “But what is psychology?” – “What is it about a 
phenomenon that makes us classify it as a psychological phenomenon?” Etc. 
 
Fortunately, I now have a job where I am not only allowed, but in fact required to 
pose such questions, since I have been hired to work in the fields of general 
psychology and also qualitative methods, which is another of my main interests. 
 
About psychology 
If some of you have had a chance to look at my papers, you will know that I have this 
perhaps strange approach to psychological phenomena – acting, thinking and feeling 
(and everything in between) as normative phenomena, and what I will do in these 
brief remarks is to present and clarify what could be meant by this. And perhaps also 
sketch some consequences for sociocultural psychology, which is in my mind the 
only psychology that is genuinely worthy of its name, psychology. The human soul, 
the mind, the psyche, is a sociocultural entity. Or, more to the point (for it is not 
really an entity or object), the concept of mind refers in my view to an array of 
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intellectual, volitional and emotional capacities that centrally involve the use of 
language. In other words, the mind is an array of rational abilities, it is a general term 
for our skills and dispositions (Coulter, 1979:13). The mind is not some thing that can 
be understood as an element in the physical world’s chains of causes and effects, and 
it is also not some private realm of consciousness, as the Cartesian tradition believes. 
In this case, as in many others, we should follow Aristotle rather than Descartes or 
the modern materialists. 
 
Thus, the mind is not a thing or a place. As the great American philosopher Hilary 
Putnam says: “ the mind is not a thing; talk of our minds is talk of world-involving 
capabilities that we have and activities that we engage in” (Putnam, 1999:169-170). 
If we conceive of the mind as a thing, we immediately ask ourselves “but where is 
this thing?” And today, the most obvious answer seems to point to the brain. Thus, 
we get the fallacies that plague contemporary cognitive neuroscience, arising from 
the attempt to locate something in physical space that in its very nature is non-
localizable. It is not meaningful to ascribe mental capabilities to the brain. The brain 
does not think, feel, perceive, act, or remember. Only persons do these things, and of 
course they need their brains in order to do so, but the brains are not doing the job. As 
“world-involving capabilities”, to borrow Putnam’s term, there is no metaphysical 
gap between the mind and the world, just as there is no metaphysical gap between our 
hands and things. The mind, in a sense, is a complex extension of our hands that 
enables us to manipulate and cope with the world and its events. And whenever we 
do something, we become subject to normative evaluation. When we address a 
psychological phenomenon, we can not only ask ”did it happen?”, but also: ”was it 
done well?” John Dewey expressed much of this by saying that the mind is not a 
noun, but a verb. Here is a nice quote from Dewey: 
 
 ”Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal 
 consciously and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves. 
 Unfortunately, an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of 
 action into an underlying substance that performs the activities in 
 question. It has treated mind as an independent entity which attends, 
 purposes, cares, and remembers” (Dewey, 1934:268). 
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Just as we should not ascribe psychological phenomena to the brain, we should also 
not ascribe them to a mind, as Dewey points out. The mind is not a thing that does 
something, but a term for our ways of dealing with things and other people. 
 
Something that follows from this is that mental life is normative, as I said. Mental life 
is lived in what some philosophers call the space of reasons rather than the space of 
causation (cf. McDowell, 1998:296). I believe that the existence of mental life 
presupposes special human practices of giving and asking for reasons for what we do, 
think and feel. Or, to put it in slightly different terms, mental life is constituted by 
normative rather than causal connections. These normative connections, as 
instantiated in social practices, is, to me, the proper subject matter of psychology and 
something that sociocultural psychology often investigates (however in slightly 
different terms). 
 
Let me illustrate the difference between the space of reasons and the space of 
causation by introducing two brief and simple examples: 
 
Example 1. A doctor taps on my knee, and my leg moves. This is a pure physiological 
or reflexive process that can be fully explained in causal terms. We can state the 
cause of the leg’s movement, but we cannot meaningfully articulate a reason. The 
event is not as such a mental event. Of course, the doctor may have had a reason to 
tap on my knee (i.e., to examine my reflexes), but the movement of the leg as such is 
causally determined: I had no reason to move my leg, and there are no normative or 
conceptual processes involved. 
 
Example 2. I watch a sad movie and begin to cry. At first sight, this looks very much 
like the first episode, because it appears that the movie is the cause of my sadness. 
But there is an important difference that makes this second event a mental event. For 
in this second case, I can state a reason for the change in my mood (e.g. “when she 
left him, it was so sad that I had to cry”). Was it warranted? Perhaps I did not 
understand the movie; perhaps it was full of irony that I did not catch? By becoming 
aware of this, I may be brought to understand that I had no reason to cry. In the first 
episode, such normative considerations are irrelevant. We can say that the second 
episode is a mental process because it is subject to normative moral evaluation. It 
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could be that my reaction expressed a deep, moral sensitivity on my behalf (and thus 
was morally praiseworthy), or it could be that my reaction was “too much” and 
improper (and thus morally blameworthy). 
 
The idea that mental life is lived in the space of reasons can be traced to Wittgenstein, 
and, in a sense, all the way back to Aristotle. I will mention just one example to 
illustrate this: Although Aristotle understood motivation (to take a classic 
psychological subject) as a natural phenomenon, he did not think that it could be fully 
understood in causal terms by natural scientists (the phusikos). He claimed that we 
also need the work of the “dialectician” (Robinson, 1989:81). For the latter human 
scientist “would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or 
something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood.” 
(Aristotle quoted from Robinson, 1989:81). What Aristotle called “dialecticians” 
rightly place anger in the space of reasons, for they know that there is such a thing as 
justified anger in the face of preposterousness. What makes “boiling of the blood” (or 
some modern neurophysiological equivalent) anger, is not something found in the 
blood (or in the brain), but precisely that it is situated in a practical and normative 
context where it makes sense to question, justify and state the reason for “boiling of 
the blood”. Were this phenomenon entirely outside the space of reasons, we would 
confine it completely to the science of physiology. 
 
As Rom Harré (1983:136) once pointed out, the reason why dread and anger are 
mental phenomena (i.e., emotions) but not indigestion or exhaustion, for example – 
although all of these have behavioral manifestations as well as fairly distinctive 
experiential qualities – is that only the former fall within a normative cultural moral 
order. In order for us to identify something as a mental phenomenon (rather than a 
physiological one), we always presuppose some particular set of norms of 
justifications – however implicitly. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued: “Psychologies 
[…] express and presuppose moralities.” (MacIntyre, 1988:77). But why talk about 
the evaluative background as a moral order? Why is it not just conventional, like the 
rules of football? Because, to quote from Alfred Louch’s book on Explanation and 
Human Action: “To identify a piece of behaviour as an action is already to describe 
experience by means of moral concepts” (Louch, 1966:26-27). The reason we call 
something an act simply is that we can judge it morally – or so I argue. 
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The question then becomes: From where does the normativity of mental life 
originate? My answer is that mental life is normative because it is lived in social 
practices. Or what we could appropriately call culture. Different practices offer 
people different reasons to act, think and feel in required ways, and these reasons 
serve as our source of justification for what we do, think, feel and say. Different 
practices, e.g. the practices of the courtroom and the dinner table, display different 
normative affordances. When we observe people thinking, for example, we observe 
them engaged in practices in which there exists a normative difference between good 
and bad ways of thinking that does not originate in the individual. This normativity 
exists in the practices, and is what individuates and defines practices as such. And 
when we examine the normativity of social practices, we need what has been called 
“thick ethical concepts” (for example virtue concepts) that involve contextual 
meaning and a union of fact and value. We cannot make do with “thin” ethical 
concepts like ‘good’ or ‘right’. My paper on the naturalistic fallacy is all about this 
issue. 
 
All practices, as MacIntyre has argued in After Virtue (from which we have read a 
chapter), contain standards of excellence. Practices are in fact constituted by their 
standards of excellence (MacIntyre, 1985a). They are constituted by their “internal 
goods”, i.e., by the goods participants achieve when they excel in the practice. There 
is no need to postulate a mental realm of psychological activity behind the practical 
actions of thinking, feeling and acting in order to account for the normativity of 
practical life (Harré, 2002:143). This does not mean that individuals do not think, 
feel, or act; of course they do, but it is only possible for them to do so because their 
activity is framed in a space of reasons in which they are susceptible to normative 
standards that do not arise from individual mentality. 
 
This culturalist view quite easily leads to relativism: For if normativity is internal to 
practices, and if practices are historically and culturally variable, then it becomes 
difficult to evaluate a given practice morally. The practice of torture has its own kind 
of normativity and so do the practices of criminal gangs. Here we end up with some 
kind of nihilist social constructionism. My answer to this challenge implies the 
argument that not all normative necessities in mental life are conventional (and thus 
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historically contingent), for certain norms are objective moral values in the sense that 
they are not themselves conventional, but the condition of there being any 
conventions whatsoever. The philosopher Anthony Holiday (1988) has articulated 
this view in an important book on Moral Powers. Holiday’s argument revolves 
around his observation that all semantic and normative necessity must be seen as 
ultimately grounded in moral necessity: There are certain language games, to use 
Wittgenstein’s term, which Holiday calls “core-language-games”, that are essential to 
any language imaginable. These core-language-games function to preserve certain 
moral values without which language would lose its communicative force, and hence 
its meaning. Holiday identifies three such core-language-games that I will all too 
briefly sketch here: 
 
1. Truth-telling language games: There are truth-telling language games that serve to 
preserve the value of truthfulness, which cannot be construed as a mere convention or 
a changeable social construction. This value is presupposed by any conventions or 
processes of social construction. Adherence to the truth-telling norm “is not itself 
conventional, but the condition of there being any conventions whatsoever”, as 
Holiday says (1988:93). 
 
2. Justice language games: And there are justice language games, which are those we 
engage in to determine guilt and innocence in non-arbitrary ways. As a value, it is a 
condition for our having a language and a form of life, rather than something 
constructed in speaking. If there were no objective normative distinctions between 
guilt and innocence, it would not be possible for us to distinguish harm-attracting 
activities from safe ones (Holiday, 1988:105), and we could not trust participating in 
some practice, though it did us no harm yesterday, would not be treated as treason 
tomorrow (ibid:105). We would thus not be able to engage in language games at all, 
and language would be impossible. 
 
3. Ritual language games: Finally, and perhaps more congenial to conventional 
cultural studies, there are ritual language games, or simply rituals. If we are to have 
linguistic and normative practices, and complex forms of human life, there has to be 
what Holiday calls “deep-seated agreement which is only possible if the integrity of 
the persons who speak the language is sustained, and clearly this cannot be done 
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unless reverence for persons and their rights to speak and be listened to is a prevailing 
norm.” (Holiday, 1988:109). This presupposes a respect for ritual that is necessary to 
create and maintain a particular form of life. 
 
We can say that such core-language-games serve to protect an elementary moral 
normativity in human life. My conclusion here is that we not only live in a moral 
world because we have language and mental life. In a sense, it is the other around: 
We have language and mental life because of objectively real moral values. 
Consequently, moral norms should be indispensable components of sociocultural 
psychology, for the phenomena of this science are constituted by moral orders. So, in 
summary, my two central theoretical conclusions are very simple: First: 
Psychological phenomena are normative. Second: Not all normativity is conventional 
(and morality is one important kind of non-conventional normativity). This means 
that psychology cannot be value-free, for it studies phenomena that make sense only 
if considered on an evaluative background. And one sense in which psychology is 
value-laden in a radical way is that it can itself affect the normative space of reasons 
that it studies. For example when we come to interpret our lives and actions in light 
of psychological knowledge and theories – which we constantly do in our 
contemporary “psychologized” world. So psychology has moral effects as well as 
moral contents. Studying the normative moral orders that structure mental life can 
itself contribute to the development of these moral orders – in good ways or bad. 
Studying the normative moral orders in good ways should in my view be a central 
task for sociocultural psychology. No other psychologies are able or willing to do the 
job. 
 
 
 
 
